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THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED HONESTY IN CONTRACT: IS
NEITHER A SLIPPERY SLOPE NOR A “NEW VISTA” OF
CONTRACT NULLIFICATION THAT SHOULD CONCERN
BUSINESSES OR FRANCHISORS
John J. Jacko, III *
In the fourteen years since the New York Law Journal published
Franchising: LJL Transportation, Contract Nullification by Franchisor, 1 the sky
has not fallen nor has the concept of honesty in contract slipped down any slope
that threatens contract law generally or franchise systems, specifically. Time has
proven the critic, the criticism, and any consternation for the franchise
termination opinion in LJL Transportation, Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp. 2 and
the implied honesty in contract doctrine to be wrong.
One franchise contracts treatise embraces and cites the LJL case for the
proposition that “[h]iding revenue from the franchisor in order to avoid paying
royalties, which conduct is in breach of the franchise agreement, does not entitle
a franchisee to an absolute right to cure its breach prior to termination of the
agreement.” 3 In other words, franchisors are permitted to immediately
terminate—and are not otherwise required to adhere to cure periods in franchise
agreements—when the franchisee commits acts of dishonesty that go to the heart
of the business relationship, like paying royalties. Conceptually, there is no
reason that this implied honesty in contract concept cannot be applied to permit
immediate termination of non-franchise contracts containing cure periods where
the breaches arise from severe acts of dishonesty by the breaching party.
In LJL, an intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court held that “there are
circumstances where the nature of the breach permits the aggrieved party to
immediately terminate the contract despite a ‘cure’ provision” and affirmed a
franchisor’s immediate termination of a franchise agreement for breach of an
implied honesty obligation, even though the franchisor failed to abide by the
franchise agreement’s cure provision. Thus, LJL and the decisions it cited 4
*
JOHN J. JACKO, III (J.D., Emory University School of Law, 1992) is a business, commercial, and
franchise litigation partner with the law firm of LEECH TISHMAN FUSCALDO & LAMPL LLC. Mr. Jacko is also
the author of Honesty Is Fundamentally the Best Policy, LJN’S FRANCHISING BUS. & L. ALERT, Vol. 13, No. 2
(Nov. 2006). The author conveys his appreciation to colleague, Allan P. Hillman, Esquire for his editorial
contribution to an early draft of this article.
1
Rupert M. Barkoff, Franchising: LJL Transportation, Contract Nullification by Franchisor, 236 N.Y.
L.J. 3 (Nov. 27, 2006), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/900005468018/franchising/.
2
905 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), order aff’d, 962 A.2d 639 (Pa. 2009).
3
62 Am. Jur. Bus., 2d Private Franchise Contracts § 214.
4
E.g., Southland Corp. v. Froelich, 41 F. Supp. 2d 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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imposed an implied honesty obligation in contract performance that superseded
any “cure” right. Analyzing the LJL decision’s impact, this author suggested that
the implied honesty obligation would be beneficial to franchisors, 5 while a critic
suggested that it represented a “new vista” of contract nullification that would
be neither beneficial to contract law, generally, nor franchise systems,
specifically. 6
The criticism of the implied honesty doctrine was that it threatened
contractual certainty. Both 1) time, and 2) the lack of slippery slope evidence,
have exposed the fallacy of this criticism. In truth, dishonesty in contract
performance poses a greater threat to franchising and contract law than does any
potential for “inconsistency” in the application of the implied honesty
obligations on contracting parties. The rarity with which severe dishonesty
breaches justify immediate termination is evidenced by the fact that, after the
first seven years following the LJL decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit recognized it as “the only case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found a breach to be severe enough to justify immediate termination of a
contract with a right-to-cure provision involv[ing] fraudulent conduct by one of
the contracting parties.” 7 Contrastingly, one decisional dissent concluded that
the majority “seemingly” endorsed an expansion of the doctrine to encompass a
company’s “obstinate behavior” to frustrate the purpose of a shareholder
agreement even though the issue was not addressed in detail in the majority’s
memorandum. 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate appellate LJL
decision in 2009, holding without “difficulty” that “when there is a breach of
contract going directly to the essence of the contract, which is so exceedingly
grave as to irreparably damage the trust between the contracting parties, the nonbreaching party may terminate the contract without notice, absent explicit
contractual provisions to the contrary.” 9 To reach this decision, the LJL court
cited case law from multiple jurisdictions, including New York federal cases
like Southland Corp. v. Froelich. 10 Subsequent courts have applied LJL’s
5
John J. Jacko, III, Honesty Is Fundamentally the Best Policy, LJN’S FRANCHISING BUS. & L. ALERT,
Vol. 13, No. 2 (Nov. 2006).
6
See Barkoff, supra note 2.
7
Milton Reg’l Sewer Auth. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 648 F. App’x 215, 217 (3d Cir. 2016)
(alteration in original).
8
TeleTracking Techs., Inc. v. Gori, No. 940 WDA 2014, 2015 WL 7093512, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. May
28, 2015) (Bender, P.J.E., dissenting).
9
LJL Transp. Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 A.2d 639, 652 (Pa. 2009).
10
41 F. Supp. 2d 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Southland Corp. v. Mir, 748 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.N.Y.
1990); D.C. Films, Inc. v. Best Film & Video Corp., 46 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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reasoning in contract contexts outside of franchising. 11 Time and the conceptual
underpinnings of the implied honesty doctrine provide additional support to
assuage any “new vista” concerns about that doctrine’s effect on modern
contract law or franchising.
At issue in LJL was the propriety of the franchisor’s immediate termination
of a franchise agreement in response to a franchisee’s demonstrated and
admitted dishonesty, where the franchisor did not provide notice and an
opportunity to cure under a 90-day cure provision. There was no express right
to immediate termination for dishonest conduct in the franchise agreement. The
grounds for termination were that the franchisee (1) improperly shipped
products through third parties affiliated with the franchisee, and (2) failed to
disclose the shipments and make royalty payments on them. The trial court
awarded summary judgment to the franchisor because the franchisee was hiding
its transactions and cheating the franchisor. 12
On appeal, the franchisee unsuccessfully argued that the termination was
improper because 1) it deprived the franchisee of the absolute right to a ninetyday cure period, and 2) the absolute right to cure meant that the franchisee should
have been given the opportunity to pay the royalties on the shipments that were
improperly diverted. Rejecting these arguments, the intermediate appeal court,
and later the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, adopted the reasoning of cases from
New York 13 and other jurisdictions relating to incurable breaches arising from
egregious conduct. 14
The critic’s concerns of the threat to contract law and franchising, which LJL
represented, were always overstated. LJL is nothing more than an incremental
extension of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 138-year-old decision in Lyon v.
Pollard. 15 The franchisor in LJL cited Lyon, as did a few of the cases on which
the LJL courts relied.

11
E.g., Falls v. State Farm Ins. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (demonstrating
that a former employee’s dishonest conduct constituted a material breach of employment contract that relieved
former employer of obligation to perform); see also Stacey v. Redford, 226 S.W.3d 913, 918–19 (Mo. Ct. App.
2007) (favorably citing LJL in support of the “general principle of Missouri law” that “does not require written
notice to be given when doing so would be a vain and useless act” and as being “in accord with appellate
decisions from other jurisdictions more specifically holding that the failure to give written notice, pursuant to a
notice-and-cure provision in a contract, does not prevent immediate termination of the agreement if the breach
is incurable.”).
12
LJL Transp., 962 A.2d at 639-50.
13
See supra note 12.
14
LJL Transp., 962 A.2d at 650-51.
15
87 U.S. 403 (1874).
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In Lyon, a hotel owner terminated the hotel manager’s employment because
she was deemed unfit to perform due to her use of opiates and unsound mental
condition. Recognizing that the owner’s exercise of the contractual right of
termination after a cure period was not “the only remedy” available, the Lyon
court—without citation to precedent—held that if the manager “rendered
herself, or otherwise became, incapable of performing [her] duties, that of itself
authorized [the employer] to rescind or terminate the contract.” 16 The owner was
“not bound to continue as the superintendent of a large hotel a person who was
a lunatic, or who was so stupid under the influence of narcotics that her presence
was a danger and an injury, and who could render no reasonable service”
because the “contract on her part implied some capability of performing the
duties she had assumed, of rendering some service” such that if she could not
render the required services, then the employer was not bound to continue
employment for the required thirty day termination notice period. 17
The Lyon decision figures prominently in the oft-cited decision in Olin Corp.
v. Central Industries, Inc. 18 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed the issue of whether the existence of a contractual termination
provision provided the exclusive means of contract termination in a review of
the conflicting contract concepts characterized as the Corbin and Williston
treatise views. In the Corbin view, such a contractual provision constitutes the
exclusive means of terminating the contract and requires compliance with
termination notice provisions. 19 In the Williston view, such provisions are not
determinative, but rather are a cumulative remedy that does not bar the ordinary
remedy of termination for a material breach that goes to the root of the matter or
essence of the contract, unless the provision by its terms is “exclusive.” 20 In
other words, other common law remedies remain available under the Williston
view absent an express statement of the provision’s exclusivity. The Fifth Circuit
adopted the Williston view and the franchisor in LJL made this its argument on
appeal.

Id. at 404 (alteration in original).
Id.
18
576 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1978).
19
6 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1266, 64 (1962), reprinted in 13 SARAH HOWARD
JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS-DISCHARGE §68.9 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed., 2003) (the Olin decision’s
“pronouncement of the right of a party to put an end to an agreement because of the other’s material breach is
correct and in accord with this treatise”); see also LJL Transp. Inc., 962 A.2d at 649 n.4.
20
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 842, 165 n.1 (3d ed. 1962). The Third Circuit recently applied the
Williston view in Orion Drilling Co., LLC v. EQT Prod. Co., 826 F. App'x 204, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2020) citing
LJL, 962 A.2d at 652.
16
17
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Further, as the Ninth Circuit discussed in L.K. Comstock & Co., Inc. v.
United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 21 even under the more restricted Corbin
view, notice to cure termination provisions assume curable breaches. Where
there is a frustration of purpose, there is no cure right and there is sufficient
reason to permit an immediate termination.
The “new vista” criticism of the LJL decision is nothing more than an appeal
for the judicial application of the most dogmatic interpretation of the Corbin
view—that notice to cure termination provisions are an absolute bar to
termination by any other method or remedy! This is not a refutation of the
Williston view, but rather is merely a statement of the critic’s preferred view.
The jurisdictions are split as to which view should be applied and how. By
analogy, as distinct from the Corbin view, the current Williston treatise discusses
contract “rescission” and “termination” by de-emphasizing legalistic semantics
and advocating the practical utility of permitting co-extensive remedies in
affording relief. It attaches no significance to the use of words like “rescission,”
“termination,” or “abrogation” which are unnecessarily confusing since “a
contract may be terminated not only by mutual consent, but also by the act of
one party, or by the court.” 22 The practical ease with which the more expansive
Williston rubric can be applied may explain why the majority of courts favor it
over the more technical and legalistic Corbin rubric. 23
Federal cases applying Pennsylvania fiduciary duty law, 24 like “[v]irtually
all of the reported cases,” 25 have consistently determined that neither the
franchisor/franchisee relationship, nor underlying franchise agreements, create
any fiduciary relationship. Yet, a “new vista” critic—without citation to any
legal authority and contrary to the majority of decisional case law—used the LJL
decision to suggest that “there may be a fiduciary relationship, or something
akin, in a franchise agreement.” 26 That critic used the LJL decision to identify a
880 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1989).
26 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §68.3 (4th ed. 2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (formerly 12
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §1454A (3rd ed. 1962)).
23
See, e.g., Manpower Inc. v. Mason, 377 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (applying the Williston
view).
24
See Onconome, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, No. 09cv1195, 2009 WL 5064481, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
17, 2009) (“Contractual relationships, even franchise agreements, do not ordinarily give rise to confidential or
fiduciary relationships between the parties.”) (citing Cottman Transmission Sys., LLC v. Kershner, 536 F. Supp.
2d 543, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citations omitted)); see also 2 Summary Pa. Juris. Torts § 16:41 (2d ed.) (“[A]
fiduciary relationship is not established by a franchise relationship between the parties.”) (citing AAMCO
Transmissions, Inc. v. Harris, 759 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1991)).
25
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 222 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 4th ed. 2015).
26
See Barkoff, supra note 2.
21
22
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hypothetical threat to franchise systems that fails to recognize the longstanding
judicial application of the Williston view to permit immediate contract
termination for fundamental dishonesty in contract performance—
notwithstanding any cure period provision. The critic’s fallacious hypothetical
forebodingly foresees the possibility of franchise system collapse due to a
sudden exodus of franchisees who—armed with the LJL decision’s reasoning—
might elect en masse to immediately terminate their franchise agreements upon
learning of franchisor dishonesty using the example of franchisees caused to pay
higher supplier prices because of secret kickback payments being made by the
suppliers to the franchisor.
First, the dishonest acts by the LJL franchisee deprived the franchisor of its
franchise fees—an “essence” of the relationship—as contrasted with the
hypothetical dishonest franchisor whose acts, even if unlawful, do not deprive
the franchisees of any of the fruits of their franchise agreements—most
especially not their fundamental license right to use the franchisor’s trademark
in marketing—the core of franchising! As the critic might agree, and as that
critic’s own franchise treatise confirms, the fruit of any franchise that a
franchisee enjoys is the right to operate and utilize “a system of marketing and
distributing goods and services in accordance with standards and practices
established by the trademark owner, who furnishes a well-established trademark
and brand image, expertise, training, stability, and marketing know-how.” 27
As despicable as the hypothetical kickback scheme is, it does not result to
deprive the franchisees of the fruits of their franchise agreements because no
rights to operate or utilize the trademark or the associated system of marketing
established by the hypothetical franchisor are lost. The scheme is not a misuse
of the trademark that would confuse the public as to the quality or provider of
goods and services being sold thereunder nor does it risk an adverse impact upon
the “consistency and quality of the goods and services bearing the trademark”
which, after all, are the nexus of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 28
Unlike the LJL franchisee’s dishonest acts—which likely did or would
confuse the public as to the provider and quality of the services being provided—
the hypothetical kickback scheme would not go to the heart of any contractual
obligation of a franchisor on which a franchisee would depend, nor would it
27
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25. See also Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 A.2d 207, 211 (1976)
(“[T]he franchise has evolved into an elaborate agreement by which the franchisee undertakes to conduct a
business or sell a product or service in accordance with methods or procedures prescribed by the franchisor . . .
.”); 16 C.F.R. § 436.2 (2007) (defining “franchise”).
28
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25.
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deprive any franchisee of its investment. Thus, hypothetical franchisees would
have no immediate right to terminate under either LJL or the Williston view.
Second, the right to immediately terminate for dishonest acts that go to the
heart of the franchise relationship is a benefit not only to franchisors, but also to
honest franchisees. Franchise systems have an interest in protecting the goodwill
of their trademarks. Franchisees can, and often time do, compete with their
fellow franchisees. In this intra-system competition, honest franchisees should
not be unfairly disadvantaged by the opportunistic acts of dishonest franchisees.
Dishonest franchisee acts, by implication, run counter to selling goods and
services in accordance with the franchisor’s prescribed methods and is deserved
of judicial intolerance. For courts to recognize this as a benefit to honest
franchisees in no manner signals the erosion of judicial enforcement of
contractual notice and cure provisions where franchisees fail to meet their
contractual obligations due to neglect or ineptitude. In such circumstances,
contractual notice and cure provisions will continue to be judicially enforced
under the Williston view. Thus, traditional judicial enforcement merely runs
parallel to the imposition of an implied honesty obligation with a permissible
immediate termination right for non-curable breaches.
Third, the courts have historically demonstrated a “strong tendency . . . to
uphold the sanctity of contracts” 29 and sparingly apply the Williston view. The
resultant limited volume of case law is a testament to the absence of any practical
contract uncertainty with which contract law or franchise systems must be
concerned. Application of the Williston view is like the application of equitable
principles: any uncertainty inherent in their application is no more threatening
to franchise systems than when equity is applied by any court. For a critic to
focus on the magnitude of the potential loss, i.e., destruction of the franchise
system, is wrong, since the analysis should instead be driven by recognition of
the fact that economic efficiencies and “efficient breaches” 30 in search of a better
deal are what permit contracting parties to willfully, but honestly, breach their
contracts—provided they are willing to pay the other party’s expectation
damages. Thus, it is fair to argue that a greater societal threat to the continued
viability of the contractual theory of efficient breach rests in 1) tolerating
dishonesty in contract performance and 2) requiring parties to contract around
it, than does exist in permitting immediate termination for dishonesty
notwithstanding the existence of a notice to cure provision. Economic efficiency
presumes that the parties are performing their contractual obligations honestly
29
30

FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 25.
JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 110 (5th ed. 2011).
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while dishonesty in that performance, e.g., theft and fraud, should constitute
enough reason to immediately end a contractual relationship without regard to
any notice to cure provision.
Lastly, the dishonest acts in LJL were not curable. 31 At least one court has
refused to enforce a statutory notice-to-cure period designed to protect dishonest
franchisees. 32 Applying the Corbin view to preserve a cure right for dishonest
actors sends the wrong message to contracting parties and to the franchise
community.
Although the debate on applying the conflicting Corbin and Williston views
will continue, it is incorrect to argue that the Williston view is a “new vista” of
contract uncertainty with which franchise systems ought to be concerned. Time
and longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent and its progeny, all make it fair
to conclude that honesty in contract performance remains of paramount
importance to American jurisprudence, not a threat to it. Thus, contract law and
franchising both will endure with vibrancy far into the foreseeable future.

31
See also, e.g., 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW §13:12 (1990) (“Strict compliance with a notice and
cure provision is not required where it would be futile . . .. For example, a franchisor could terminate a franchise
agreement without complying with a notice and cure provision where the franchisee engaged in dishonest and
fraudulent behavior.”) (citations omitted).
32
See AAMCO Indus., Inc. v. DeWolf, 250 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. 1977) (refusing to enforce statutory 24hour notice to cure provision to protect franchisee where any attempt to cure was futile and franchisor issued an
immediate termination for franchisee’s dishonest and illegal acts).

